Abstract: The last decade has seen a proliferation of empirical studies that seek to understand how the cognitive system links voluntary motor actions with their perceptual effects. A view that has found considerable support in this research is the ideo-motor approach to action control which holds that actors select, initiate, and execute a movement by activating anticipatory codes of the movement's sensory effects We, first review the empirical evidence from different paradigms showing that effects of voluntary actions become anticipated during response production. In a second step we survey empirical data investigating the nature of the mechanisms that link voluntary motor actions with their intended and expected perceptual effects. We argue that the integration, or binding, of perceptual and motor codes occurs in action planning where features of intended effects are selectively bound to features of the actions that are selected to achieve these effects in the environment. As a final step we will summarize empirical findings that may elucidate the particular roles of effect-code activation in response production and control. 
Introduction
In the 1980s Wolfgang Prinz published a book (Prinz, 1983) and several papers (Prinz, 1984 (Prinz, , 1987 (Prinz, , 1990 ; see also Prinz, 1997 ) that prepared the ground for an impressive body of empirical studies seeking to understand how humans plan and control voluntary actions (for a review, see Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) . Prinz´s core contention was that perceived events and planned actions share a common representational domain (common coding approach to perception and action). His second contention was that actions are planned and controlled in terms of their effects -that is, that intentional actions are controlled by anticipatory representations of intended and expected action effects.
The emphasis on action effects in action control echoes the ideomotor approaches of philosophical psychology in the 19 th century (Herbart, 1824; Lotze, 1852; Harless, 1861; Münsterberg, 1888 James, 1890) . Basically, these early ideomotor theorists have focused on how consciousness can acquire and exert control over the human body (for overviews, see Prinz, 1987; Stock & Stock, 2004) and assumed that actions are represented in memory in terms of effect codes. Münsterberg (1888) and James (1890) considered the anticipation of an action goal, i.e. the anticipation of the desired effect, to be a necessary precondition for executing a particular action. Lotze (1852) stated that the anticipation of a movement goal will make the body realize what the mind intends to do. These early ideomotor approaches to action control, deeply rooted in the introspective tradition of theorizing, were almost forgotten, even officially discredited (Thorndike, 1913) during the heydays of behaviorism and information-processing theory (for overviews see Prinz, 1987) . And yet, ideomotor concepts have seen a renaissance in the last two decades, and empirical evidence in their support is steadily increasing.
The first attempts to verify experimentally the ideomotor principle were reported by A.
Greenwald in 1970 (Greenwald, 1970a (Greenwald, , 1970b (Greenwald, , 1970c . More recently, Hommel (1993) investigated the impact of action effects on action control in a study on the Simon effect. This effect arises when stimuli and responses vary on overlapping spatial dimensions (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) . In the Hommel (1993) study participants responded to low-and high-pitched tones by pressing a left-vs. right-hand key. The location of the tone was not relevant but tones appeared randomly to the left or right of the subject. Conditions like that are known to yield better performance (faster and less error-prone responses) if stimulus and response correspond, hence if the tone signaling the left response appears on the left or if the tone signaling the right response appears on the right side -this is the Simon effect (for an overview, see Lu & Proctor, 1995) . The aim of the Hommel (1993) study was to show that changing the actor"s action goal could modify the Simon effect. In two experimental groups, each key was connected to a light on the opposite side, so that pressing the left key caused a brief light flash on the right side and pressing the right key produced a flash on the left side.
Although the two groups performed exactly the same task with identical stimulus-response and response-light mappings their instructions differed. One group of participants was instructed to press the left/right key in response to the low/high tone (key instruction), whereas the other group was instructed to flash the right/left light accordingly (light instruction). The idea was that persons with a key instruction would specify their action goals in terms of key location whereas they would specify their goals in terms of light location with a light instruction. As these locations were always opposite to each other, the Simon effect should be completely reversed: A left-side stimulus should facilitate left-hand key presses under key instruction but right-hand key presses under light instruction -simply because with light instruction the goal of a right-hand key press should be flashing a left-side light. In more general terms, the occurrence of the Simon effect should depend on the overlap between stimulus and intended action effect and not just on the overlap between stimulus and response. And this is what happened: While participants in the key group produced a typical Simon effect (i.e., better performance with stimulus-key correspondence) the light instruction completely reversed the pattern of results (i.e., better performance with stimulus-light correspondence). Thus, the correspondence between stimulus and instructed goal determined the effect.
These observations implicate that intentions and action goals or effects play an important role in the planning and control of actions. Obviously, the action"s goal determines how responses are cognitively coded and represented. If it is "pressing a key" the response is coded in terms of the location of the key and/or the finger operating the key. If, however, it is "flashing a light" the very same response is coded in terms of the location of the light that the finger movement switches on. In other words, responses are coded in terms of the effects they are intended to produce (the action-effect principle).
Further evidence supporting the action-effect principle comes from a study by Kunde, Hoffmann and Zellmann (2002) . In Kunde et al.´s experiments participants performed a speeded choice-reaction task with four stimuli (colors) and four responses (key-presses). Two of the key-presses triggered the presentation of a low-pitched tone and the other two the presentation of a high-pitched tone. Shortly before a stimulus was displayed the required response was indicated by a cue. In 25% of the trials the cue was invalid, i.e., not the cued key-press was actually required but one of the three remaining key-presses. These invalid trials offered the opportunity to assess the effects of anticipated action effects on response preparation. In half of the trials, the actual key-press produced the same acoustic effect as the key-press being indicated by the cue, and in the other half of trials the key-press was coupled with the alternative auditory effect. The important finding was that after some practice an unexpected response was initiated faster when the required response shared its effect tone with the prepared response.
Altogether, firstly these findings strongly indicate that planning an action must have involved the anticipation of action effects (i.e., the activation of action-effect codes) at some point in the process of action production. They, secondly, indicate that the ideomotor logic is by no means restricted to body-related, proximal effects of a movement (feeling and seeing the finger moving to and touching a light switch when intending to switch the room light on) but also applies to more remote and external, distal effects of a movement (seeing the room illuminated after operating the light switch). This opened the door for a wide range of empirical investigations, simply because external, remote effects can be much better experimentally manipulated than proximal, body-related effects.
Action effects are part of the mental representation of actions
There is now ample further evidence showing that action effects or action goals that, by definition, can only be attained after an action has been executed are involved before action execution starts. Two complementary research strategies have been chosen to establish the claim that action effects actually play a role in the mental representation of the action itself.
The first strategy has been to show that responding is facilitated when the effect of a to-beexecuted response is presented during action planning, and the second has been to show that action planning is facilitated if there is an overlap between features of the response and features of the effect.
Following the first strategy, participants are usually confronted with novel, action-contingent events (action effects) in an acquisition phase with the expectation that this leads to an integration of effect and action codes. To diagnose the hypothesized action-effect binding, in a later phase of the experiment effect-related stimuli are presented prior to action execution.
The critical question then is whether or not effect-related events presented while producing the response to the action-demanding stimulus would have an impact on action planning.
Generally, the answer to this question is positive. For instance, in Hommel"s (1996) experiments, participants first learned that their responses (different key-presses) would produce different effects (high and low pitched tones). Later they responded to visual stimuli with the key-presses. Together with each visual stimulus, one of the response effects was presented. Responses were faster if the presented effect was the effect of the required response. The results were interpreted as evidence for an integration of the motor pattern representing a certain movement and the cognitive pattern representing the effects of that movement in the environment.
Action-effect learning seems to be a rather general phenomenon, as effective learning has been demonstrated not only for auditory stimuli but also for visual letters that, unlike acoustic events, can easily be ignored (e.g. simply by looking away, closing one"s eyes, and so forth). Ziessler and Nattkemper (2002) adapted the flanker paradigm introduced by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) to investigate the involvement of effect codes in the preparation of a motor response. In the experiments participants first learned that their responses to stimulus letters were followed by the presentation of a new letter on the screen. The new letter was presented contingent to the response, i.e. as a response effect. To diagnose the hypothesized action- What was observed was that compared to the effect-incompatible and neutral conditions responding was faster under the effect-compatible condition (c.f. Fig. 1 ). To explain these findings, Ziessler and Nattkemper (2002) assumed that response preparation involves the anticipation of the response effects. In the effect-compatible condition the same effect codes are activated by the anticipation process as well as by external stimulation. This might facilitate response planning, which, in turn, results in shorter response times.
Similar observations have been reported for visual locations (Hommel 1993) , words (Hommel, Alonso, & Fuentes, 2003) , and the affective consequences of action (Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002 To meet this requirement two experimental strategies have been pursued: Ziessler et al.
(2006) developed a paradigm in which ´affordances´ (lawful relationships between object characteristics and movement parameters in the sense of Gibson, 1966 Gibson, , 1979 evoked by anticipated effects might interfere with action-related information conveyed by a stimulus being presented prior to action execution. The experiment consisted of an acquisition phase and a test phase. In the acquisition phase participants learned that left or right key-presses would produce a picture of a beach ball or of a steering wheel on the screen. On presentation of an "O" participants were free to choose one of the two responses. In the test phase participants were required to prepare a left response on presentation of a yellow square and a right response on presentation of a yellow triangle. However, they were instructed to withhold their responses until the appearance of two hands on the screen (GO signal). The hand postures either corresponded with affordances inherent in the learned response effects or they did not (i.e., a catching-related hand posture would correspond with the action-directed potential of a beach ball but would not be suited to efficiently operate a car"s steering wheel). Importantly, there was no relationship between the GO signal and the required response. As expected, Ziessler and colleagues found that the correspondence relation between the hand postures signaling action execution and inherent affordances of learned response effects affected performance. Responding was delayed when the GO signal indicated an action that was not related to the action-directing potential inherent in the learned response effects. To explain these results we have to assume that participants anticipated the effect of the required response (the steering wheel or the beach ball) in course of response planning. Only then, the relationship between the GO signal and the effect could affect response times.
Further evidence showing that action effects really play a role in action control is provided by studies that demonstrate effects of the compatibility between responses and their effects (R-E compatibility effects). For instance, persons were shown to respond faster if the spatial locations of visual effect and response matched. That is, spatially specified actions are initiated faster when they reliably produce spatially compatible effects as compared to incompatible ones (spatial R-E compatibility effect; Hommel, 1993; Kunde, 2001) . Similar R-E compatibility effects have been reported for intensity and velocity (Kunde, 2003; Kunde, Koch & Hoffmann, 2004) . Spatial R-E compatibility effects are not confined to overlapping physical features of actions and their effects but extend well to situations where anticipated action effects refer to implicit, mentally generated spatial information (Nattkemper, Ziessler & Frensch, 2007 ). This conclusion emerged from studies where numbers were introduced as action effects. As Dehaene (1997) argues, the relative magnitude of numbers is spatially coded on a mental "number line". Small numbers are allocated on the left, higher numbers on the right of the number line. In reaction time experiments this leads to a compatibility effect; relatively small numbers are faster responded to by left responses, relatively larger numbers by right responses. This phenomenon became known as Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (or SNARC effect) (Dehaene, 1992 (Dehaene, , 1997 ; for a review see Fias & Fischer, 2005) . Surprisingly, Nattkemper and colleagues observed that not only responding to numbers but also producing numbers by key presses generated the SNARC-effect. Responses to visual features (color or shape) of objects were faster when the mapping of response keys to the numbers they produced was SNARC-compatible (i.e., when a left key-press produced 2 or 3 as effect and a right key-press 7 or 8) than when it was incompatible (i.e., when the left key produced relatively large numbers and the right key relatively small numbers). In other words, response planning is facilitated if there is an overlap between spatial features of the response and (non-physical) spatial features of the effect. This adds convincing support to the notion that (1) effects of voluntary actions become anticipated during response production and (2) that anticipations of forthcoming effects have the power to interfere with the motor system.
In both types of experiments described in this section the action effects itself could not prime the response. The effects were not physically present before the execution of the response.
Nevertheless the compatibility between features of the effect and features of the GO signal in the first type of experiments and features of the responses in the second type of experiments affected the response time. These findings conclusively indicate that preparing a response must have involved the activation of response-effect codes at some point in the process of response production. More generally, we have good reasons to believe that anticipatory representations of intended and expected action effects are involved in action control.
How do motor patterns get connected to cognitive codes representing the perceptual consequences of movements?
Though the issue of action-effect learning has been studied quite extensively in recent years and empirical evidence in support of the ideomotor principle is steadily increasing, there are at least two key questions that are still under debate. The first concerns the nature of the mechanisms that link voluntary motor actions with their intended and expected effects. As a simple learning mechanism one could assume an associative mechanism connecting action codes with codes representing a movement"s (body-related and distal) consequences. In fact, that is the idea of a two-stage model proposed by Elsner and Hommel (2001) as a modern variant of Lotze"s (1852) and Harless´s (1861 solution to the question of how motor patterns can be brought under intentional control. Elsner and Hommel proposed that action-effect learning has a very simple associative (Hebbian) basis and described action-effect binding as the result of automatic processes by which associations between "motor pattern(s)" activated in the "motor system" and representations of the movement"s sensory effects in the "cognitive system" are established (Elsner & Hommel, 2001, p. 230 ).
In the first stage of the Elsner & Hommel model, individuals are assumed to acquire associations between movement representations and representations of those events that frequently co-occur with the movements. At this stage, voluntary actions do not exist; only random movements produce various perceivable body-related and external effects, which are registered and associated with the motor patterns producing the movement, following the
Hebbian principle that what fires together wires together. The result is a sensory-motor structure that integrates "codes of any perceptual consequence or effect of a given movement .
. . with the motor neurons producing this movement and thus become its cognitive representation" (Hommel, 2009, p. 513 ). Once such a structure is acquired it can be used to access motor patterns to achieve desired goals: activating the perceptual part of the structure by imagining features of an intended action effect (goal) primes the motor means to bring these effects about. From now on action effects can be produced intentionally by activating the codes of desired effects, which then spread their activation to the associated motor codes via a reversal of the learned action-effect association.
This view on action-effect acquisition is based on observations from learning studies (Elsner & Hommel, 2001 ; see also Hommel, 1993 Hommel, , 1996 where participants first learned that their responses (different key-presses) would produce different effects (R1  low pitched tone, R2
 high pitched tone). In a subsequent test phase they were asked to respond to the former effect tones, which were presented as imperative stimuli now. It turned out that an action was performed faster in response to a tone that it had previously produced (low pitched tone  R1, high pitched tone  R2) than to a tone that had been produced by the alternative action (low  R2, high  R1) -hence, an acquisition-consistent mapping of tone and response allowed for faster responding in the test phase than an acquisition-inconsistent mapping. In a second set of Elsner and Hommel´s (2001) experiments response choice was free not only in the learning phase but in the test phase, too. Elsner and Hommel found that presenting action effects could bias the free choice of responses: participants more often selected the response that had preceded a particular tone in the acquisition phase (i.e., the acquisition-consistent response) than the alternative response (i.e., the acquisition-consistent response).
These and related observations from brain-imaging studies (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher, Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel, and Gruber, 2008 and studies on action-effect learning in children (Eenshuistra, Weidema, & Hommel, 2004) have provided ample evidence suggesting that it makes sense to assume that perceiving an action-effect sequence results in the integration of action-related and effect-related codes. However, what is less clear is on what sort of codes the hypothesized integration process operate. Elsner & Hommel (2004) argued that action-effect binding consists of an association between motor patterns activated in motor areas and cognitive codes representing the movement"s sensory effects. Taken literally, this would suggest that overt execution of responses is a prerequisite for action-effect binding to occur. However, Ziessler & Nattkemper (2002) demonstrated that the overt execution of responses in the acquisition phase is not required to produce action-effect binding in a go/no-go paradigm and showed that action planning processes are sufficient to produce binding between responses and their sensory consequences.
Recently, Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass (2009) extended these findings by showing action-
effect binding for what they called "intentional non-action". In their study participants had three freely chosen response options: for the acquisition phase they were instructed to decide on presentation of a visual Go-signal between pressing a left or right button (intentional action) and no button (intentional non-action). When participants overtly responded left and right button presses produced specific effect tones. When the no-button press option was chosen a third tone was presented as "non-action" effect (its presentation was determined with reference to the history of Rt"s in button press trials).
On the basis of the assumption that intentional non-actions resemble intentional actions in that Altogether, the data showing that action-effect binding can be observed in the absence of overt responses contradicts one way of reading the Elsner and Hommel approach to actioneffect acquisition, namely that action execution is a necessary prerequisite for action-effect binding to occur. Rather, it seems that even higher level representations of actions and their subsequent effects can be integrated suggesting that action execution may be sufficient to create such bindings but it is not necessary.
In an attempt to understand why action-effect binding can be observed even in the absence of overt responses, provided that action planning takes place, Ziessler and colleagues suggested that the mechanisms underlying action-effect acquisition may be tied to processing structures that serve action planning. In a nutshell, Ziessler, Nattkemper, and Frensch (2004) reasoned that action codes are not connected to the encountered effects but rather to the anticipated effects that constitute the motor intention. Preliminary evidence in support of this view emerged from a study, which showed that action-effect learning is subject to interference from a secondary task (Ziessler, Nattkemper & Frensch, 2004 ). In the primary task, the responses of participants to stimulus letters produced new stimulus letters as action effects. In addition to the stimuli of the forced choice reaction task, tones were presented at different points in time, either before responding (during action planning) or after response execution (but before the presentation of the action effect). Participants were either instructed to monitor the tones or to ignore them. When participants had to monitor the tones, they were asked to count the high-pitched tones and to indicate the calculated number after each block of trials.
The critical question then was whether or not the presentation of the tones at different points in time would affect action-effect learning.
If action-effect acquisition were based on associative mechanisms that automatically link responses with subsequent changes in the environment, the presentation of the distracting tone between response execution and the actual effect should impair effect learning. In this case the associative learning process would connect the response not only with the effect stimulus but also with the random tones. Overall, this should reduce the contingency between the response and the following events. By contrast, tones presented during response planning should not influence action-effect learning. The only perceptual event contingently following action execution was the effect letter, which should easily be accepted for integration. Hence, following associative views of action-effect learning clear indications of effect learning should be obtained with tones being presented before action execution starts and reduced learning with tones being presented after action execution.
Two observations emerged. Firstly, when counting tones was required action-effect learning was substantially reduced. This was independent from whether the tones were presented before or after action execution. Hence, it seems that the operations being in charge of the tone-counting task interfered with action-effect learning. This may indicate that action-effect learning requires cognitive resources and suffers from an overlapping task -a conclusion that does not necessarily speak against associative models of action-effect acquisition when one assumes that action-effect bindings need to be consolidated in order to affect subsequent behaviour. As memory consolidation is known to be resource demanding (Jolicour & Dell'Acqua, 1998), it may well be that it suffers from an overlapping task, such as tone counting.
More conclusive with respect to the assumptions of associative models of action-effect acquisition is the second observation showing indications of action-effect learning when counting of tones was not required. Interestingly, the amount of learning depended on whether the tones were presented before or after response execution. Large learning effects were found when tones occurred after response execution and minor effects when tones occurred before response execution. Hence, it seems that action-effect learning is vulnerable to disturbances arising in the planning phase of an action.
Based on the findings that action planning processes may be sufficient to produce binding between responses and their sensory consequences Ziessler and colleagues questioned the assumption that action-related codes are bound to effect-related codes simply due to cooccurrence of both activation patterns and suggested that the binding between actions and their sensory effects is mediated by anticipating an action"s effect during action planning.
With this view, action-effect binding emerges when the response is planned and the actioneffect is actively anticipated.
In an attempt to understand how action planning can contribute to action-effect acquisition Ziessler et al. (2004) have proposed a model that integrates components of the forward and inverse models of motor control (e.g. Frith, Blackmore, & Wolpert, 2000; Jordan, 1996; Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998) . The crucial point of the model is that learning of action effects is not described as an association between movement patterns and effects in the environment. Rather, it is assumed that action-effect binding emerges in action planning when a prepared motor program is linked to the effects that the program execution should cause in the environment. The model (c.f. Fig. 3 ) suggests to make a distinction between the desired effects and the anticipated effects. Depending on the environmental situation and the internal state, goals are set for the behavior. Thus, the goals are the desired effects of the to-be-planned behavior.
Then the motor program is selected that is likely to achieve these goals. This process has been described in terms of inverse models. Based on the selected program, the cognitive system anticipates the effects that the program execution should cause in the environment in terms of forward models. Then the anticipated effect is compared with the desired effect. This allows for an internal test of the selected program. Differences between desired and anticipated effects cause modifications of the motor program. However, if the anticipated effects are in correspondence with the desired effects, then the selected motor program receives additional activation that facilitates its execution. Thus, the interaction between the inverse and the forward model provides a circuit that is important for internal testing of the planned behavior and to initiate the execution. Critical for the system is the learning of action effects. We assume that the system learns to anticipate the effects that will be produced by a prepared motor program. The learning is controlled by the comparison between anticipated effects and the actual effects. Differences result in an adjustment of effect anticipation.
As the model describes it, action-effect binding emerges in action planning when motor programs are linked to the effects that the program execution should cause in the environment. Hence, it is assumed that the binding between actions and their subsequent sensory effects is mediated by anticipating environmental effects during action planning. In a novel situation, the effect anticipations are abstract and are related to dimensions on which changes in the environment are likely to occur. Later, the anticipations will be specified as a function of prior experience. The model involves a step-by-step specification of effect anticipation, starting with rough and ending with specific expectations of particular effects.
Thus, the main components for learning should be the action plan and the effects. As in the forward model, learning occurs when there is a difference between the anticipated effect as part of the action plan and the actual events in the environment and consists in an adaptation of the prediction processes. Action execution is not necessary for learning. From this point of view, action-effect learning is an integrated part of action planning, as it requires the anticipation of effects in course of action planning and a modification of action planning as an expression of learning. What follows is that action-effect learning should be intimately tied to processes involved in action planning. And this is what was found -action-effect learning was impaired when action planning was impaired.
Based on the assumptions underlying the anticipative learning model Ziessler and colleagues raised the question for the selectivity of action-effect binding. More specifically, they argued that the anticipation of action-effects during action planning should bias the cognitive system to preferentially search for those events in the environment that are compatible with the expected events. Thus, it would come as no surprise that action-effect binding operates selectively depending on the actor"s intention.
Preliminary evidence for this assumption stems from a study by Ziessler, Nattkemper, & Frensch (2004) . In an initial acquisition phase, participants were presented with one of eight letters which were to be responded to with one of four button presses. These responses led to the presentation of one out of 8 possible effects each consisting of a letter not used as a stimulus and a digit. Neither S-R nor R-E associations were instructed beforehand, but emphasis was put on the fact that there was a systematic relationship between responses and effects, such that one group of participants was instructed to find out how to produce the digits while another group was instructed to find out how to produce the letters. To diagnose action-effect learning, both kinds of effects, i.e. letters as well as digits, were used as flankers in both instruction groups in the test phase of the experiment. The idea was to provide the opportunity to study the influence of intended and non-intended effects on the response to the Thus, it may be concluded that only those flankers affected behavior in the test phase that belonged to the instructed category of action-effects while ignoring the information related to the non-intended effects. Although these data do not exclude that the non-instructed actioneffects, too, played a role in the acquisition phase, they obviously indicate that the instructed action-effects were weighted more highly than the non-instructed. This led Ziessler and colleagues to conclude that the acquisition of action-effect structures is at least modulated by intention.
Recently, Herwig, Prinz and Waszak (2007;  see also Herwig & Waszak, 2008) However, in all groups the actions were contingently followed by certain effect tones. That is, in all groups participants performed identical movements (key presses with the index finger of the left or the right hand) which were immediately followed by effect tones (e.g., high-or low-pitched tones). The only difference between the groups was whether the actions were selected in an intention-based or in a stimulus-based mode of movement. Most interestingly, in the test-phase evidence for action-effect learning could only be found after intention-based acquisition. It was only in this group that an action was executed faster if triggered by a tone that the action had previously produced than if triggered by a tone that had been produced by the alternative action. In contrast, after stimulus-based acquisition no indication of actioneffect learning was obtained, i.e. the mapping of the former effect tones as imperative stimuli on the responses did not affect response times.
When we, now, consider what follows from the findings reported so far it seems that actioneffect binding may be more than linking action-related codes to effect-related codes simply due to the co-occurrence of both activation patterns. This may be the case when agents start learning a certain task with a tabula rasa concerning their action repertoire and concerning the effects that would accompany and follow certain actions (i.e., children, infants, and novices who acquire action effects in the first place). However, the agents that we usually study in experiments on action-effect learning do not start with an action tabula rasa but are equipped with a sophisticated action control machinery that reflects an individual"s history of interacting with the world. Thus, it is not surprising that action-effect learning (at least in expert actors like the participants in our experiments) can be more than simply exploiting the coincidence of movements and their sensory effects. The reported evidence suggests that contiguity and contingency between actions and effects seem to be necessary for action-effect learning to occur. However, an intention to produce a certain effect also seems to be sufficient for action-effect learning to occur, provided that the effect can be contingently produced by a certain action. For explanation it seems worthwhile to consider action-effect learning as a byproduct of efficient action planning where features of intended and expected effects get bound to features of the actions that are selected to bring these effects about. This would fit very well to the findings showing that action-effect learning did occur when agents acted in an intention-based mode but not when they acted in a stimulus-based mode. According to Herwig et al., agents pass on control to the stimuli in the stimulus-based mode and the system merely acts upon presentation of a particular stimulus attribute in a pre-specified way (in the sense of a prepared reflex, Hommel, 2000) . In this mode, the cognitive system is prepared ahead of the stimulus by instruction (Wenke, Gaschler, & Nattkemper, 2007; Wenke, Gaschler, Nattkemper, and Frensch, 2009 ) and the participant"s prior stimulus-response learning history which create representations that integrate or bind codes of the actionrelevant stimulus attributes and the corresponding action codes (stimulus-response bindings ;
see Allport, 1987; Logan, 1988; Hommel, Pösse, & Waszak, 2000; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003) . If these bindings are stored in memory, they may serve to guide actions based on external stimulus events without requiring to plan actions in terms of their sensory consequences. By contrast, action-effect learning is boosted when actions are governed with respect to their sensory consequences. In this case, action planning involves anticipating the effects of a certain action. Anticipating the outcomes of executing a particular action may bias or pre-tune the perceptual system to search for and to identify the anticipated effects in the environment. Comparing encountered and expected sensory consequences then provides the opportunity to generate an error signal that may be used to update internal models that capture the relations between actions and their effects. .
What are codes of action-effects used for?
A second question that is under debate is the question for the functional role of effect-code activation in action production and control. Proponents of the ideo-motor approach to action control , Kunde, 2003 claim that performing an action leaves behind an association between the action"s motor code and the sensory effects the action produces (action-effect bindings). By virtue of repeated experience this eventually results in creating a sensory-motor structure that integrates motor codes with codes of the perceptual events that represent action-effects. The associations between motor codes and perceptual codes are assumed to be bidirectional. Perceiving or imagining events that resemble learned action-effects will activate the perceptual part of the structure and will finally prime or induce the motor patterns that have been learned to produce these events. Do effect-codes prime motor representations?
At first sight the above sketched compatibility effects obtained with exogenously as well as endogenously activated effect codes seem to be consistent with the assumption that both perceived and anticipated events gain the power to induce actions. Further evidence has been provided by Elsner et al. (2002) and Melcher et al. (2008) who showed that the mere perception of auditory stimuli that previously had been presented as effect tones of certain actions results in the activation of neural structures that are selectively activated with voluntary but not stimulus-driven actions. Moreover, Kunde (2004) observed response priming by visual stimuli formerly presented as action effects although the prime stimuli were masked during the test phase and thus could not be consciously identified.
Although these observations show that action codes are activated when perceiving effectrelated events, it is less clear whether the activation of effect codes really is the prerequisite for accessing and selecting responses as considered in ideo-motor approaches. If this would be the case, one should be able to show that effect codes have access to relatively early phases of response production which can be equated with what traditional information-processing models label as "response selection". Thus, effect-code activation should precede response selection, simply because codes of effects serve as mental cues for the selection of appropriate motor patterns.
Until now there are only few studies that directly addressed the functional role and the locus of effect-code activation. Using the well-established PRP-paradigm (Pashler, 1984 (Pashler, , 1994 Logan & Gordon, 2001 ) Paelecke and Kunde (2007) These results indicate that advance information about the to-be-produced effects had little or no effect on response times. It seems that effect-related information presented before the target could not be used to activate or prime the response. This outcome is clearly not compatible with "strong" versions of the ideo-motor theory that state that perceiving events that resemble learned action-effects will prime or induce the motor patterns that have been learned to produce these events. Furthermore, no difference between neutral and effectincompatible flankers was found. Only the effect-compatible flankers facilitated the responses. In the framework of the ideomotor principle we should expect benefits for effectcompatible and costs for effect-incompatible flankers since both flanker types should activate the responses producing these effects. In case of effect-compatible flankers that would be the correct response. In case of effect-incompatible flankers that would be an incorrect response.
Thus, the missing costs for effect-incompatible flankers are further evidence against the idea that the activation of effect codes would prime the response.
In an effort to determine at what stages of response production action effects operate, Nikolaev, Ziessler, Dimova and van Leeuwen (2008) used high-density event-related potentials (ERP) in the flanker paradigm of Ziessler and Nattkemper. The analysis of the EEG data aimed at two kinds of brain activity: (1) activity evoked by the presentation of the effectrelated flankers averaged relative to their onset and (2) activity related to the selection and preparation of a motor response using lateralized readiness potentials (LRP) as a measure of covert motor preparation. What was found was (1) that ERP"s evoked by effect-incompatible flankers differed from those evoked by other flankers in the early perceptual component P1
and in a later frontal component P2, which are supposed to reflect stimulus evalution and conflict detection, respectively. Most interestingly in the present context, Nikolaev and colleagues found (2) that effects of flanker-compatibility were not observed in the stimuluslocked LRP, which was taken as evidence that effect-related flankers did not modulate motor preparation stages. By contrast, flanker-compatibility effects were observed in the responselocked LRPs, i.e. the interval between LRP onset and the overt response was affected by effect-compatibility of the flanker. This interval is thought to sensitively reflect the duration of motor processes following response selection. It was found that the time needed for executing a motor response was longer with effect-incompatible than with the other flankers.
Thus, it seems that incompatible flankers delayed the execution of the response at a point in time at which the motor program had already been prepared.
Altogether, it seems that analyzing the type and distribution of ERP"s gives us important hints about the function of effect anticipation in action planning. Effects of the effect-compatibility of flanker stimuli were observed in the perceptual peak P1, and in the later peak P2 reflecting conflict detection. These findings provide evidence that anticipated action-effects prepare cognitive and perceptual processes for the immediate consequences of an action. Information about these consequences is likely to reach the perceptual system in a top-down fashion in that the perceptual system, as result of response preparation, is biased to search for the anticipated action consequences in the environment. As indicated by the effects on the LRPcomponent, anticipated action-effects also influenced motor processes. Interestingly, however, it seems that effect-incompatible flankers did not affect pre-motor processes related to response preparation but motor processes that come into play after having prepared a certain response.
In summary, the functional role that effect-codes play in action planning is far from being understood. Facing the discrepancies between the reported results it seems that both further theorizing and further experimenting is required to understand what effect-codes are used for in action planning. 
Conclusion

